PRECURSOR TO DRUGS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL AS APPLICABLE TO INDIA

Drugs precursors and control
Sharada avadhanam
DD[FS]I/C
APPA

INDEX

Sl no
Name
Page no
1
UN special session on drugs 1998
1-3
2
Declaration on guiding principles
4-20
3
Overview of precursor control in India
21-25
4
International controls
26-28
5
Diversion and prevention
29-31
6
Intelligence collection
32-34
7
Investigation
35-39
8
Role of different agencies in preventing diversions
40-42
9
International operations
43-44
10
Abbreviations
45

CHAPTER 1
UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DRUGS 1998
The six main themes are: Precursor Chemicals
The term "precursor" is used to indicate any of the substances listed in Table I or Table II of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, except where the context requires a different expression. Such substances are often described as precursors or essential chemicals, depending on their principal chemical properties. The plenipotentiary conference that adopted the 1988 Convention did not use any one term to describe such substances. Instead, the expression "substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances" was introduced in the 1988 Convention. It has become common practice, however, to refer to all such substances simply as "precursors"; although that term is not technically correct, it is used in this text for the sake of brevity.
In recent years, the diversion of precursor chemicals used to manufacture illicit drugs has become one of the most serious challenges confronting international drug control efforts. To prevent it, countries have agreed to monitor domestic and international movements of certain chemicals. The General Assembly Special Session will promote concerted global action by adopting measures to further strengthen the control of precursor chemicals and setting 2008 as the target date for a significant reduction of the diversion of precursors.


Amphetamine-Type Stimulants (ATS)
Amphetamine-type stimulants are the most abused synthetic drugs manufactured clandestinely. . A wave of synthetic stimulant abuse has been reported in recent years. As global awareness of the problem is still limited, and responses to it are heterogeneous and inconsistent, the Special Session will call on Governments to give high priority to ATS and will consider an Action Plan against Manufacture, Trafficking and Abuse of Amphetamine-type Stimulants and their Precursors. TARGET DATE IS 2008 for a significant reduction of the manufacturing, trafficking and abuse of ATS.
Judicial Cooperation
Member States to enhance judicial cooperation IN extradition, mutual legal assistance, transfer of proceedings, controlled delivery, illicit traffic by sea and other forms of cooperation and training. BY 2003.
Money Laundering
Member States commitment to the provisions of the 1988 Convention, concerning the seizure and confiscation of proceeds of drug crimes, BY 2003.
Drug Demand Reduction
The Declaration on the Guiding Principles of Drug Demand Reduction will be an essential tool to reduce the demand for drugs by 2008 .
Elimination Of Illicit Crops And Alternative Development
National drug crop elimination strategies should include comprehensive measures, such as alternative development programmes, law enforcement and eradication. The creation of a supportive environment through innovative programmes .
CHAPTER 2
DECLARATION ON THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF DRUG DEMAND REDUCTION
I. THE CHALLENGE
2. Drug abuse affects all sectors of society and countries at all levels of development. Therefore drug demand reduction policies and programmes should address all sectors of society.
III. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
8. The following principles shall guide :
(a) There shall be a balanced approach between demand reduction and supply reduction, each reinforcing the other, in an integrated approach to solving the drug problem;
(b) Demand reduction policies shall:
(i) Aim at preventing the use of drugs and at reducing the adverse consequences of drug abuse;
(ii) Provide for and encourage active and coordinated participation of individuals at the community level, both generally and in situations of particular risk, by virtue of, for example, their geographical location, economic conditions or relatively large addict populations;
(iii) Be sensitive to both culture and gender;
(iv) Contribute to developing and sustaining supportive environments.

IV. CALL FOR ACTION
B. Tackling the problem
10. Demand reduction programmes should cover all areas of prevention, from discouraging initial use to reducing the negative health and social consequences of drug abuse. They should embrace information, education, public awareness, early intervention, counselling, treatment, rehabilitation, relapse prevention, aftercare and social reintegration. Early help and access to services should be offered to those in need.
Governments should consider providing, either as an alternative to conviction or punishment or in addition to punishment, that abusers of drugs should undergo treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation and social reintegration. Member States should develop within the criminal justice system, where appropriate, capacities for assisting drug abusers with education, treatment and rehabilitation services.
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
S-20/4. Measures to enhance international cooperation to counter the world drug problem
A
ACTION PLAN AGAINST ILLICIT MANUFACTURE, TRAFFICKING AND ABUSE OF AMPHETAMINE-TYPE STIMULANTS AND THEIR PRECURSORS
The General Assembly
Adopts the following Action Plan against Illicit Manufacture, Trafficking and Abuse of Amphetamine-type Stimulants and Their Precursors:
I. Raising awareness of the problem of amphetamine-type stimulants
2. The international community should give higher priority to combating the problem of amphetamine-type stimulants in all its aspects. The competent entities of the United Nations system should give appropriate consideration to that problem. The subject of amphetamine-type stimulants should be given higher priority and should become a regular item on the agenda of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.
II. Reducing demand for illicit amphetamine-type stimulants
9. International bodies such as the United Nations International Drug Control Programme and the World Health Organization should, on a regular basis, (a) collate current information on the health effects of amphetamine-type stimulants and their by-products; (b) study the social, economic and cultural driving forces of demand for amphetamine-type stimulants; (c) identify, document and disseminate good practices in the prevention and treatment of abuse of amphetamine-type stimulants, as well as in the prescription of licit amphetamine-type stimulants; and (d) coordinate work with non-governmental organizations in these areas.
10. States should (a) continuously monitor changing patterns of abuse of amphetamine-type stimulants; (b) investigate social, economic, health and cultural dimensions of abuse of amphetamine-type stimulants; (c) give priority to research, where capacity is available, on the long-term health effects of abuse of amphetamine-type stimulants; (d) use and disseminate the results of these activities, including the information collated by the international bodies, for targeted prevention and treatment efforts as well as, where appropriate, public awareness campaigns; and (e) include in their education campaigns, information on the harmful effects of abuse of amphetamine-type stimulants.


III. Providing accurate information on amphetamine-type stimulants
15. States should (a) use modern information technology to disseminate information on adverse health, social and economic consequences of abuse of amphetamine-type stimulants; and (b) encourage methodological development, standardized terminology and coordinated data collection on amphetamine-type stimulants through, inter alia, participation in the international clearing-house system.
IV. Limiting the supply of amphetamine-type stimulants
18. On the basis of the existing framework for precursor control provided by article 12 of the 1988 Convention, related Economic and Social Council resolutions and recommendations of the International Narcotics Control Board, the competent authorities at the international, regional and national levels should take the following actions specific to precursors for amphetamine-type stimulants: (a) the promotion of close cooperation with industry to establish measures and/or a code of conduct governing trade in precursors for amphetamine-type stimulants; (b) enhanced implementation of the control measures against the diversion of precursors for amphetamine-type stimulants listed in the 1988 Convention, including greater use of pre-export notifications and improved procedures for information exchange at the national and international levels; (c) improved monitoring of non-scheduled substances that have been identified as frequently used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants, including voluntary cooperation between authorities and the relevant branches of industry in order to help to identify suspicious transactions; (d) the establishment of an international special surveillance list of the substances referred to in (b) above as part of a general early warning system; (e) consideration of punishing, as a criminal offence in the sense of article 3 of the 1988 Convention, the diversion of non-scheduled chemical substances with the knowledge that they are intended for use in the illicit manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants; and (f) exchanges of information between all the agencies concerned, including in investigations concerning such non-scheduled substances, to detect and prevent illicit trafficking.
19. In order to target the clandestine manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants, international, regional and national authorities should also (a) monitor clandestine manufacture methods; (b) develop drug signature analysis and profiling; (c) monitor, to the extent possible, sales of laboratory equipment, in compliance with article 13 of the 1988 Convention; (d) train all enforcement and control personnel involved in the technical complexities of amphetamine-type stimulants; and (e) investigate the possibility of developing procedures for differentiating between groups of substances with closely related chemical structures and for detecting individual substances within amphetamine-type stimulants, for use by enforcement authorities.
21. On the basis of the 1971 Convention and related Economic and Social Council resolutions, competent authorities, in cooperation with industry, should closely monitor developments in the licit manufacture of, trade in and distribution of amphetamine-type stimulants in order to detect and prevent (a) diversion into illicit channels from manufacture and international and retail trade (pharmacies); and (b) irresponsible marketing and prescribing of such substances. They should also cooperate closely with the International Narcotics Control Board by exchanging all relevant information in accordance with the 1971 Convention and related Economic and Social Council resolutions.
V. Strengthening the control system for amphetamine-type stimulants and their precursors
23. Concerning the wide area of regulatory control, international and regional organizations as well as States should, as appropriate:
(a) Rapidly identify and assess new amphetamine-type stimulants found on illicit markets; States may then wish to use such assessments to determine whether they should bring such substances under control so that legal action can be taken against illicit manufacture and trafficking;
(b) Improve the technical basis of control, particularly with regard to increasing the flexibility of the process of scheduling. This would involve the application of one of the following models used in different countries: (i) emergency or simplified scheduling processes; (ii) scheduling based on structurally similar groups (analogues); and (iii) control for purposes of criminal prosecution, based on similarities in chemical structure and known or anticipated pharmacological effects;
B
CONTROL OF PRECURSORS
I. Measures to prevent the illicit manufacture, import, export, trafficking,distribution and diversion of precursors used in the illicit manufactureof narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances
A. Legislation and national control systems
Problem: The necessary actions to be taken by States to prevent diversion, and the success of those actions in identifying attempted diversions and stopping shipments, are possible only if States have established an adequate legislative basis or system of control that allows them to monitor effectively the movement of precursors. Furthermore, mechanisms and procedures must be established for effective implementation of the legislation in place.
2. In order to establish effective systems of control, States need to identify competent national authorities and their specific roles and to share that information with other States. They also need to share details of the actual control measures applied.
3. Many States have not yet taken those necessary steps.
Action: States, in cooperation with competent international and regional bodies and, if necessary and to the extent possible, with the private sector in each State, should:
(a) Adopt and implement, where they have not already done so, the national laws and regulations required for strict compliance with the provisions and proposals of article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988,2 and related resolutions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the Economic and Social Council, including, in particular, the establishment of a system of control and licensing of the enterprises and persons engaged in the manufacture and distribution of substances listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention and a system for monitoring the international trade in such substances for the purpose of facilitating the detection of suspicious shipments, and designate competent national authorities responsible for implementing such controls;
(b) Review regularly, and take appropriate steps to strengthen existing precursor controls should any weaknesses be identified, giving full consideration to the related recommendations of the International Narcotics Control Board as contained in the annual reports of the Board on the implementation of article 12 of the 1988 Convention;
(c) Adopt penal, civil or administrative measures for punishing, in accordance with their legislative provisions, as a criminal offence in the sense of article 3 of the 1988 Convention, the unlawful conduct of individuals or companies in connection with the diversion of precursors from legitimate commerce into the illicit manufacture of drugs;
(d) Exchange experience on procedures for the adoption of legislation and on the application of measures for combating and punishing illicit traffic in and diversion of precursors, including the use, where appropriate, of controlled deliveries;
(e) Submit timely reports to the International Narcotics Control Board on national regulations adopted to control the export, import and transit of precursors, including details of the requirements that have to be met for the authorization of imports and exports;
(f) Adopt the necessary measures to ensure that the disposal of seized chemicals has no harmful effect on the environment.
B. Information exchange
Problem: Rapid and timely information exchange between importing and exporting States is the key to effective precursor control, allowing States to verify the legitimacy of individual transactions and identify suspicious shipments in order to prevent the diversion of precursors. Many States have not yet established systematic mechanisms to ensure such rapid communication exchange, including timely feedback, with other competent national authorities, and with the International Narcotics Control Board, even on a confidential basis.
6. Similarly, traffickers quickly turn to sources in other States when they are denied the chemicals that they require. Experience has confirmed the importance of immediately sharing information on diversion attempts and suspicious transactions or stopped shipments with other States, and with the International Narcotics Control Board, in order to counter such attempts elsewhere.
Action: States, in cooperation with competent international and regional bodies and, if necessary and to the extent possible, with the private sector in each State, should:
(a) Improve their mechanisms and procedures for monitoring trade in precursors, including the following actions:
(i) Regular exchange of information between exporting, importing and transit States, and with the International Narcotics Control Board, on exports of precursors before they take place, including, in particular, in addition to the requirements of article 12, paragraph 10, of the 1988 Convention, the provision by exporting States of pre-export notification to the competent authorities in importing countries for all transactions involving the substances in Table I, and acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate; as well as notification of the Secretary-General upon the request of the importing country. Recognizing the importance and usefulness of pre-export notifications for combating effectively the illicit production of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and, particularly, amphetamine-type stimulants, the same efforts should be made with regard to the remaining substances listed in Table II. These measures should complement tight domestic controls in all countries, which are also necessary to ensure the prevention of diversion of precursor chemicals;
(ii) Promotion of the implementation, by competent national authorities, of mechanisms to verify the legitimacy of transactions before they take place, including the exchange of information on the legitimate domestic need for the chemical; timely feedback to exporting States by States that have received pre-export notifications; and allowance by exporting States, when requested by the importing State, of adequate time - to the extent possible, up to fifteen days - to verify the legitimate end-use;
(iii) Exchange of information between exporting, importing and transit States, and with the International Narcotics Control Board, on suspicious transactions involving precursors and, where appropriate, on seizures effected and denials made;
(b) Keep confidential any industrial, business, commercial or professional secrets or trade processes contained in the reports provided by States on the export, import or transit and intended use of precursors, in accordance with the provisions of article 12, paragraph 11, of the 1988 Convention. Where necessary, an appropriate legal framework should be set up to ensure the suitable protection of personal data;
(c) Notify, as rapidly as possible, the International Narcotics Control Board, and the other States concerned as they consider necessary, of any decisions to deny a permit for the shipment of a precursor if it has not been possible to verify the legitimacy of a transaction, whether an import, an export or a trans-shipment, providing all relevant information concerning the reasons for the denial, so that other States may consider taking a similar course of action. Whenever an importing, an exporting or a transit State is considering issuing a permit for shipment, it should make its decision with due assessment of all the elements of the case, and in particular of any such information provided to it by the State that has denied the issue of a permit for that shipment.
C. Data collection
Problem: Information on the normal patterns of legitimate trade and on the licit uses of and requirements for precursors is necessary to verify the legitimacy of individual transactions. Without such information, it is difficult to monitor the movement of precursors as required under article 12 of the 1988 Convention. Many States are not yet able to collect data on the licit movement of precursors. The inability to do so may indicate that the framework and systems for adequate control are not in place and that competencies in the field of precursor control have not been clearly defined.
Action: States, in cooperation with competent international and regional bodies and, if necessary and to the extent possible, with the private sector in each State, should:
(a) Design and establish flexible and effective mechanisms, where they do not already exist, subject to provisions for confidentiality and data protection, for obtaining data on the licit manufacture, import or export of precursors, and on any other activity related to the trade in precursors and for monitoring the movement of such substances, including the establishment of a register of public or private companies engaged in any activity relating thereto, which are to report suspicious orders for, or cases of theft of, precursors and to cooperate at all times with the competent national authorities;
(b) Establish or strengthen cooperation with associations of the chemical trade and industry, and with persons or companies engaged in any activity related to precursors, for example, through the establishment of guidelines or a code of conduct, to intensify efforts aimed at controlling such substances;
(c) Establish the principle of "know your customer" for those who manufacture or market chemicals in order to improve the exchange of information.
II. Towards more universal international cooperation in precursor control
Problem: Achievements in preventing the diversion of precursors have been due to the activities of a growing, but still relatively small, number of Governments of exporting, importing and transit States and territories worldwide.
11. Those States have taken specific steps to monitor the movement of precursors through their territories, even when they do not have comprehensive legislation for precursor control in place. However, many States have not yet developed adequate systems for precursor control, in spite of the fact that traffickers have exploited as points of diversion those countries and territories where controls are inadequate. Controls do not serve their purpose if all States facing similar situations with regard to the trafficking of precursors do not take similar practical steps to ensure that diversion attempts are identified or do not share their experiences in implementing controls. More uniform action is required by all States to limit the availability to traffickers of the precursors required for illicit drug manufacture.
Action : States, in cooperation with competent international and regional bodies and, if necessary and to the extent possible, with the private sector in each State, should:
(a) Institutionalize uniform procedures to facilitate the widespread, multilateral exchange of information on suspicious transactions and stopped shipments in the course of implementing national precursor control laws and regulations based on the international drug control conventions and related resolutions, guidelines and recommendations, in such a way as to complement bilateral or regional agreements;
(b) Promote multilateral arrangements that encourage the exchange of essential information for effective monitoring of the international trade in precursors, to complement similar bilateral or regional agreements, with special emphasis on devising practical systems for sharing information on individual transactions;
(c) Disseminate more systematic information on the ways and means used by criminal organizations for illicit trafficking in and diversion of precursors, with a view to adopting measures to prevent such illicit activities, in accordance with article 12, paragraph 12 (c), of the 1988 Convention;
(d) Promote technical assistance programmes for States upon request, according the highest priority to those with the least resources, for the purpose of strengthening control of precursors and avoiding their diversion for illicit purposes;
(e) Promote the exchange of experience relating to police, customs and other administrative investigation, interception, detection and control of diversion of precursors;
(f) Organize expert meetings, where necessary, on combating the illicit traffic in and diversion of precursors in order to promote professional skills and raise levels of expertise.
III. Substitute chemicals
Problem : Some of the substances required for illicit drug manufacture that are listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention have become especially difficult to obtain as a result of the implementation of the provisions of that Convention. Traffickers have successfully sought to obtain chemicals that may be used as substitutes for those that are more closely monitored. In addition, they have identified and used new methods for processing or manufacture, requiring substances currently not listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention. They have also manufactured so-called controlled-drug analogues, many of which again require as starting material substances currently not listed in Tables I and II.
Action
14. States, in cooperation with competent international and regional bodies and, if necessary and to the extent possible, with the private sector in each State, should:
(a) Cooperate with the International Narcotics Control Board in the preparation of a limited international special surveillance list of substances currently not in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention and for which substantial information exists of their use in illicit drug trafficking, as requested by the Economic and Social Council in section I, paragraph 2, of its resolution 1996/29 of 24 July 1996, contributing to the maintenance of that list by informing the Board on a regular basis, in accordance with article 12, paragraph 12, of the Convention, about non-scheduled substances that have been diverted from licit channels to illicit traffic and promoting studies of the potential use of non-scheduled substances with a view to the timely identification of any that could be used in the illicit manufacture of drugs;
(b) Apply monitoring measures, whether voluntary, administrative or legislative, in cooperation with the chemical industry, so as to prevent the diversion from licit channels to illicit traffic of substances included on the special surveillance list, including specific monitoring measures for those substances that are relevant at the national or regional levels. In addition, States shall consider punishing, as a criminal offence in the sense of article 3 of the 1988 Convention, the diversion of non-scheduled chemical substances with the knowledge that they are intended for use in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, and introducing related penal, civil and administrative sanctions.
9th plenary meeting 10 June 1998
C:
MEASURES TO PROMOTE JUDICIAL COOPERATION
I. Extradition: 1. It is recommended that States:
(a) review their domestic legislation to simplify procedures for extradition, .
(b) Inform other States of the competent authority to receive, respond to and process extradition requests; with the name, address and telephone number of the authority .
(c) Prepare summaries of their domestic laws and extradition practices, to other States;
(d) consider extraditing their nationals for serious drug offences on agreement that they will be surrendered for prosecution but that they could be returned to serve any sentences imposed in their State of nationality;
II. Mutual legal assistance
States:
(a) Ensure that their domestic legislation enables them to implement article 7 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988;2
(b) Designate an authority or authorities with the power both to make and to execute, or to transmit for execution, requests for mutual legal assistance; .
(c) Provide other States with guides or manuals on how to make requests for mutual legal assistance;
III. Transfer of proceedings
States: (a) Make available information on their experiences in the transfer of proceedings, if they possess such experiences, to other interested States;
(b) Consider enacting the legislation necessary to transfer or receive proceedings in criminal matters;
IV. Other forms of cooperation and training
States: (a) Consider developing or expanding programmes for the exchange of law enforcement personnel, giving special consideration to exchanging experts who can assist in such areas as forensic evidence or financial investigations or who can exchange knowledge, experience and techniques concerning drug trafficking and related offences;
(b) Where appropriate, consider methods of enhancing cooperation between law enforcement agencies; improve the sharing of intelligence and the development of shared investigative strategies to combat drug-trafficking organizations operating in several States; ensure that investigative activities in one State complement those undertaken in other States; and be ready to work together on specific projects, without prejudice to the jurisdictions of the States concerned;
(c) Exchange information developed through forensic analysis, particularly on the basis of scientific profiles of seized narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors and the examination of packaging materials;
V. Controlled delivery
States: (a) ensure that their law allows for the use of the technique of controlled delivery at both the domestic and the international levels, .
(b) Consider entering into agreements with other States, neighbouring States, to facilitate the use of controlled deliveries;
VI. Illicit traffic by sea
States: (a) Review national legislation to ensure that the legal requirements of the 1988 Convention are met, for example, the identification of competent national authorities, the maintenance of ship registries and the establishment of adequate law enforcement powers;
(c) Promote regional cooperation in maritime drug law enforcement .

VII. Complementary measures
States to consider designing complementary measures
(a) The protection of judges, prosecutors and other members of surveillance and law enforcement agencies, as well as witnesses, whenever the circumstances so warrant, in cases that involve illicit drug trafficking;
(b) New investigative techniques;
(c) The harmonization and simplification of procedures to increase international cooperation;
(d) The development or strengthening of legal institutions and their capacity for judicial cooperation, especially in respect of drug-related offences;
(e) The improvement of the professionalism of criminal justice personnel through enhanced technical cooperation, training and human resource development.
CHAPTER 3
OVERVIEW OF PRECURSOR CONTROL IN INDIA
The illicit production and abuse of drugs is one of the major challenges faced by mankind today. Some drugs of abuse are produced from plants and are called natural drugs. There are three main species of plants from which drugs are produced.
The first of these, opium poppy (Papaver somniferum), is the source of opium. Opium is a natural drug which, acting on the central nervous system, has a depressant effect. The seeds of this plant, called poppy are used as a condiment in South Asian cooking.
Cannabis is the second drug producing plant. The flowering tops of this plant are called ganja while the resin derived by crushing the plant is known as hashish or charas. Like opium, cannabis is a natural drug. The third drug producing plant, the coca plant, grows in South and Central America. Coca leaves and coca paste are natural drugs derived from this plant.
These natural drugs can be processed to isolate the active ingredient, i.e., the psychoactive substance in the natural drug that actually produces the effect on the user. Such active ingredients can also be modified chemically to make them more potent. The active ingredients so isolated or their chemically modified forms are known as semi-synthetic drugs. For instance, morphine and codeine are active ingredients isolated from opium. If morphine is chemically combined with acetic anhydride, we get diacetylmorphine also known as heroin. Morphine, codeine and heroin are semisynthetic drugs produced from opium while cocaine is a semi-synthetic drug produced
from coca.
There is a third category of drugs known as synthetic drugs. These are produced solely through chemical reactions. Diazepam, methaqualone (commonly called as mandrax), amphetamine-type stimulants such as amphetamine and MDMA (commonly known as ecstasy) are examples of synthetic drugs.
The majority of the drugs of abuse are either semi-synthetic or synthetic by nature. One of the techniques of containing them is curbing their production by denying illicit drug manufacturers access to the chemicals required to manufacture drugs. Such chemicals are widely referred to as precursors. Precursors are legitimate chemicals with uses in industry, medicine, research, etc. and are legally produced. Illicit drug manufacturers divert them from legitimate trade and industry
and use them to produce illicit drugs. The job of enforcement officers is to stop this diversion without impeding the normal legitimate trade. Precursor control is thus a strategy to reduce the availability of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances by preventing illicit drug manufacturers from obtaining the chemicals they require for such manufacture.
Precursors are chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. There are hundreds of synthetic and semi-synthetic drugs of abuse. In order to produce each of them, one requires precursors. If we try to control all these precursors, our job becomes unwieldy, our efforts will be spread too thin, over too many chemicals, rendering controls ineffective. We must, therefore, identify a few key precursors and control them. For instance, we can identify the most widely abused semi-synthetic and synthetic drugs and then identify the precursors most critical to their manufacture. Since precursors are often trafficked across the borders, there should be harmony between the laws of different countries both in terms of which precursors are controlled and what kinds of controls are imposed on them.
The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (which we shall call the 1988 Convention for the sake of brevity), therefore, identifies those precursors most crucial to the illicit manufacture of drugs. These are listed in Table-I and Table-II of the convention and are universally accepted as precursors. These chemicals are listed below and their licit and illicit uses are in the annexure.
Precursors of concern in South Asia
Of the 23 precursors listed above, the following precursors are of special concern in South Asia.
Acetic anhydride
This chemical is widely used in textile processing, dyes and pharmaceutical industry. Since textiles and textile dyes are a major industry in South Asia, consumption of acetic anhydride is indispensable. In the pharmaceutical industry, the biggest consumption of acetic anhydride is in the manufacture of the common anti-pyreticsaspirin and paracetamol.
Acetic anhydride is used illicitly for the manufacture of amphetamine-type stimulants, heroin and methaqualone (commonly known as mandrax). South Asia is flanked by two of the world's largest illicit opium growing regions of the world. The opium so produced is processed into heroin. Acetic anhydride is not produced in neither of the two regions and hence traffickers
divert heroin from other regions, including south Asia and smuggle it into these regions.
Some of the world's largest methaqualone seizures during the past few years were made
in India and in almost all cases, acetic anhydride was diverted and used to produce methaqualone.
Anthranilic acid
Anthranilic acid is also legally used in pharmaceutical and textile industries. Illegal drug manufacturers use it to produce methaqualone (mandrax). Typically, this precursor is diverted and used to manufacture mandrax within India. The methaqualone so produced is largely
smuggled to South Africa and onwards to other countries in Africa which form the bulk of the market for methaqualone.
Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine
Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine have similar chemical structure. Both are used legally to produce anti-asthmatic drugs - bronchodilators and nasal decongestants. Both are illegally used to produce the amphetamine type stimulant (ATS), methamphetamine. Two of the world's largest producers of ephedrine are India and China. China extracts ephedrine from a herb, ephedra, while India produces synthetic ephedrine from molasses - a by-product of sugar factories. Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine diverted from India and China are often smuggled into Myanmar and used for illicit production of methamphetamine. The bulk of the methamphetamine so produced is smuggled into Thailand and onwards to the rest of the world.
CHAPTER 4
INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS:
Many countries - especially the ones known for illicit heroin production - neither manufacture precursors nor have the capacity to do so. Since precursors have licit uses and are available for those purposes, illicit drug manufacturers obtain them by either diverting them from international trade or through smuggling. They only rarely produce precursors themselves. International control over precursors is, therefore, essential to prevent such diversion of precursors. The 1988 Convention provides the framework for international control and ensures:
✦ Some degree of harmony between the laws of different countries and
✦ Provide mechanisms for cooperation between different countries
To coordinate these activities, the Economic and Social Council requested Governments to identify a 'competent authority' for each country who serves as national nodal authority. The Competent Authorities also interact with their counterparts in other countries as well as international bodies such as the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).
The United Nations Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, 1988
There are three UN Conventions, which deal with drug related matters:
✦ Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961
✦ Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971 and
✦ United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (hereinafter called 1988 Convention)
Although all these three UN conventions emphasized the need to regulate precursors, the 1988 convention has dealt with the subject in detail laying down the basic framework of control of precursors (Article 12). The article requires states to adopt legislative, regulatory and administrative measures they deem necessary to prevent diversion of precursors. Furthermore, trafficking should be an offence in that country's law. The convention requires parties to make it a criminal offence to manufacture, possess, transport, or distribute precursors or equipment with the knowledge that they are meant for illicit production or manufacture of drugs (Article 3). The convention also requires states to cooperate closely with one another (Article 9). What does 'co-operation' mean in practical terms? It means that:
✦ States should establish and maintain channels to facilitate rapid exchange of information.
✦ They should also cooperate in conducting enquiries.
The 1988 Convention also requires states to make effective use of the technique called controlled delivery (Article 11). In this technique, suspect consignments of precursors or drugs are not immediately seized but are allowed to reach their final destination under surveillance of the authorities to identify the real persons behind the transaction. Since consignments often move across international borders, cooperation is vital.
The role of INCB
The International Narcotic Control Board or INCB was established in 1968 under the single convention on Narcotic drugs, 1961. It is an independent quasi-judicial body for monitoring the implementation of the drug conventions. It is responsible for monitoring the control of precursors by governments. It also assesses chemicals to be placed under international control as precursors.
At a more operational level, the INCB assists governments in verifying the legitimacy of the international trade in precursors. For this purpose, the INCB maintains a databank and also interacts with the competent authorities of the importing, exporting and transit states.
The INCB receives reports from about 190 countries as well as information on individual international transactions or shipments, which have been stopped on suspicion and consignments of precursors seized. It compiles all this information and submits an annual report to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) through the Commission on Narcotic drugs (CND).
The role of Competent Authorities
Effective international control on precursors requires countries to constantly interact with one another and with international bodies. The competent authority of each country acts as the nodal point. In 1992, the Economic and Social Council requested each country to designate a Competent Authority to facilitate such interaction through which any country can receive and transmit information to the country. It also executes requests for mutual legal assistance.
Let us see in detail, what role these competent authorities can play with respect to precursor control. Competent authorities issue Pre- Export Notifications, commonly known as PENs, to importing countries. These PENs serve as advance warnings and help the authorities in the importing country to verify the legitimacy of the transaction and seize any unauthorized shipments. Competent authorities also interact with the INCB. In international trade, both the INCB and the competent authorities monitor movement of precursor chemicals. The competent authorities also assist each other in investigations involving precursor chemicals and also furnish reports to the INCB.
CHAPTER 5:
DIVERSION AND PREVENTION:

In this section we will examine the various methods that traffickers employ to divert precursors and the techniques through which we can counter them under the following five sub-headings:
✦ Methods of diversion
✦ Intelligence collection
✦ Investigation
✦ Role of different agencies in preventing diversions
✦ International operations
Methods of diversion
Precursors can be diverted from any stage in the course of legitimate trade. Some possible points of diversion are:
✦ From the place of manufacture
✦ At the point of sale
✦ During transportation
✦ During importation
✦ During exportation
✦ During use or consumption
✦ During re-cycling
✦ During destruction of seized precursors.
Traffickers employ a variety of techniques to divert precursors, including the following:
a) Under-reporting production and clandestinely removing the remaining precursor: The manufacturer of the precursor enters only part of the production in his records and diverts the rest to illicit trade and sells it at a much higher price. The manufacturer also generates more profits by evading excise duty and other taxes.
b) Theft during transportation: Criminals steal precursors in small quantities from tankers and trucks with the connivance of drivers. The quantity of precursors pilfered from each tanker or truck is so small that it can easily go undetected. But traffickers often accumulate significant quantities of precursors through repeated pilferage. In South Asia, this method has often been used to divert acetic anhydride.
c) False reporting of leakage: The consignor sends a false report stating that the tanker leaked in transit and a significant quantity of precursor was lost. The precursor is meanwhile diverted into illicit channels.
d) Misdeclaration of description: In many countries, one needs a licence to import or export precursors. Such consignments are also subjected to more intensive checks by customs services. Traffickers export the consignment of precursor chemical wrongly declaring it as a consignment of some other commodity to bypass both licensing requirements and rigorous checks. Through this method nine tons of acetic anhydride was successfully exported from India to Dubai by declaring the consignment of chemicals as consignment of acid for pickles. The diverted acetic anhydride was sufficient to produce 3.6 tons of heroin.
e) Forged no objection certificates (NOCs) or import and export permits: Traffickers place an order for the import of a precursor along with a forged import permit and if the authorities in the exporting country do not detect the forgery, a huge consignment is available for diversion.
f ) Manipulation of the quantity in the NOC or import or export licence: This involves taking a genuine license and inserting a zero in the quantity descriptor. A Mumbai-based exporter once presented an NOC from the competent authority of the importing country to export 2 million ephedrine tablets to Trinidad and Tobago. When an enquiry was conducted, it was confirmed that the actual quantity permitted in the NOC was only two hundred thousand ephedrine tablets.
The difference of one million eight hundred thousand tablets could have been easily used to produce methamphetamine.
g) Orders placed using the names of nonexistent firms: If you succeed, the entire consignment is available for illicit trade. If the authorities find out, there is very little chance of being caught.
Alternatively, using the name of a bona fide company but inserting a false contact address with false telephone and fax numbers makes it easy to import. When the time for delivery comes, traffickers ask the transporter to deliver the consignment at a different address citing some place with storage provision.
h) Conceal orders for precursors amongst innocuous chemicals: They begin with placing orders for small quantities of precursors and often conceal the true order for precursors amongst a list of innocuous or harmless chemicals and other materials.
CHAPTER 6
Intelligence collection
Intelligence, by definition, is foreknowledge - knowing all that you need to know beforehand. Since precursors are legitimate substances with a variety of legal uses, it is extremely difficult to detect diversion and trafficking without intelligence. To gather intelligence we need to concentrate our efforts at possible stages of diversion such as place of manufacture, sale and transportation. There are two methods of collecting intelligence - overt or open and covert or secret.
Overt or open methods
The overt or open method refers to the collection of information regarding a possible diversion from secondary sources like newspapers, books, and technical publications as well as data from other government sources or other bodies. The data so gathered when put through the “intelligence mill", may provide extremely useful pointers that enable the enforcement officers to decide where to concentrate their efforts. Often referred to as profiling, this helps identify the most likely suspicious consignments of precursors passing through the international trade.
Profiling starts off with the systematic analysis of past cases to determine the characteristics of a typical suspect consignment or trafficker. By examining such characteristics carefully, we can zero in on suspect consignments and traffickers. A few pointers could be: Destination of the goods
A consignment of precursors destined to a border area adjoining a country known for illicit manufacture of drugs runs a high risk of being smuggled to that adjoining country.

Change in custom house agent
If an exporter suddenly changes his custom house agent for exporting precursor chemicals, that would constitute a cause for suspicion.


First time orders should be subject to greater scrutiny.
✦ If the chemical is sold at a very high price compared with the prevailing market price, it requires a careful examination.

Unusual and special packaging of the chemical is another cause for suspicion.

✦ Similarly, incorrect or vague labelling is also a reasonable cause for suspicion.

✦ Bulky consignments of chemicals being sent by air should also be checked carefully since it does not make business sense to send such consignments by air.


Covert methods
Covert methods often provide direct, actionable intelligence. There are three primary covert methods: informers, surveillance and undercover operations.
Informers are persons with inside information about an illicit activity who are willing to share it with the authorities for any of the variety of reasons including financial reward, recognition, revenge or thrill factor. In order to get information on diversion of precursors, informers should be cultivated in places such as factories manufacturing precursor chemicals, associations of brokers and transport agencies used by such companies. Informers can also be cultivated among truck drivers engaged in the transportation of precursors, among custom house agents, forwarding agents, in inspection agencies or in the offices of port / airport authorities. Other places to cultivate informers are chambers of commerce and also in shipping lines or airlines and in roadside restaurants. You may wonder why roadside restaurants? Roadside restaurants often act as collection points for the precursors pilfered by truck drivers. From these restaurants, the precursors are sent to illicit drug manufacturers through intermediaries.

The second covert method - surveillance - is of two types; physical and electronic. Physical surveillance consists of keeping a discrete watch over places and persons, where as electronic surveillance comprises telephone intercepts, GPS-based satellite tracking, etc. Interception of telephones, when permitted legally, can be extremely useful in identifying and preventing diversions. Satellite tracking devices are extremely useful to monitor international movement of suspect consignments. Finally, undercover operations, including the infiltration of networks by agents or the conducting controlled deliveries, provide a useful source of intelligence and can be orientated directly for a prosecution in a court of law or in furthering investigations to learn more of the methods used by trafficking networks and those involved in the illicit activities.
CHAPTER 7
Investigation
Let us consider what factors can trigger investigations into cases of diversion:
a. Specific intelligence about diversion;
b. Follow-up into a detection and seizure at an illicit drug-manufacturing factory;
c. Investigations into shipments stopped in international trade as reasons exist to believe the order was an attempt to divert the precursors in question;
d. Follow-up into a case in some other country
In investigations into diversions of precursors from international trade, special attention should be paid to the following:
✦ Consignment
✦ Documents
✦ Statements
✦ Immediate follow up
Consignment
In the case of an export of precursor chemicals, the following should be checked:
✦ Does the exporting company actually exist?
✦ Is it registered for the purpose?
✦ Is the ordered chemical consistent with the use for which it is specified?
✦ Is there a requirement for this particular chemical in the importing country?
✦ Is it a first time order or is it part of an irregular ordering pattern?
✦ Has the customer specified any unusual packaging requirements?
✦ Is the consignment to travel by airfreight? Is this cost effective for the particular chemical?
✦ Is there a bona fide delivery address? Do the delivery requirements specify a post office box number?
✦ Is the consignment destined for a named individual within a company?

Documents
The documents recovered during a search should be carefully examined. Pay special attention to the following documents:
✦ Past shipping bill or bills of entry
✦ Transport documents
✦ Private documents relating to transactions
✦ Documents relating to bank accounts
✦ Documents relating to properties

Careful and timely scrutiny of documents may provide valuable clues and evidence of links between members of trafficking networks, their foreign links and the flow of money earned from the illegal venture.

Statements
Questioning the persons involved in, or concerned with, a diversion and carefully recording their statements play a very important role in successful investigations.

The statements should, among other things, contain the following:
✦ Place, date and time.
✦ Name and address of person giving the statement.
✦ Name and designation of person asking the questions.
✦ Name and addresses of persons who are witnesses, if any.
✦ Notice given to the person being questioned concerning his right against self-incrimination.
✦ Signature of the person preparing the statement should also be taken into consideration.

Investigating officers should keep in mind the following while recording statements.
✦ Use short questions confined to one topic that can be clearly and easily understood.
✦ Ask questions that require narrative answer and avoid questions that can be answered by 'YES' or 'NO'.
✦ Avoid leading questions, that is, questions that suggest an answer.
✦ Ask the interviewee how he or she learned what he or she states to be a fact.

The interviewee should also be required to deliver the factual basis of any conclusions stated.
✦ Remain alert to prevent the interviewee from aimless wandering and demand a direct response.
✦ Concentrate more on the answer than on the next question.
✦ To avoid an unrelated or incomplete chronology, the investigating officer should clearly understand each answer and ensure that any lack of clarity is eliminated before continuing further. When all the important points get resolved, the officer should terminate the interview. If possible, leave the door open for further contact with the person giving statements.

The investigating officer should get the answers from the person under questioning to the basic questions such as Who? What? Why? Where? When? and How? of the events.

Follow-up
Follow-up should be immediate and swift as any delay facilitates the destruction of evidence by the suspects. Samples of seized precursors should be drawn and sealed as per the prescribed procedure and sent to a laboratory for testing as early as possible. The chain of custody of the seized goods, documents and other forms of evidence should be properly recorded to establish their integrity in a court of law.
CHAPTER 8
Role of different agencies in preventing diversions
Different law enforcement agencies can help prevent and detect diversions of precursors and the role each agency can play is discussed below:

Role of Customs Department
Since Customs officers regulate import and export of all consignments they can play an important role in preventing their diversion from international trade.

They are also responsible for the prevention and detection of smuggling. In order to prevent diversions, custom officers should carefully examine documents related to import, export and transit consignments.

The following aspects should be checked in the documents:
✦ Was the mode of payment in conformity with normal commercial practice?
✦ Was there any unusual request for shipping or delivery?
✦ Are there any specific requests for packing / labelling / shipment that are not in conformity with normal commercial practice and or means of transport?
✦ Does the transaction involve a combination of controlled chemicals, which can be used illicitly to manufacture a controlled drug?
✦ Does the order involve an unusual mixture containing a high content of a precursor chemical?
✦ Is the means of transport, for example by air, consistent with the value of the precursor chemical?

Answers to these questions can enable customs officers to narrow down suspicious consignments of precursor chemicals.

Role of the Excise Department or Department of Trade and Industry1
This department exercises control over the manufacturers of precursor chemicals. They inspect or audit, assess the production and examine records of clearance of goods of those manufacturing units that produce and use precursors. Any unusual increase in consumption of raw materials or any inexplicable drop in the production of finished products of a precursor manufacturing unit should be carefully scrutinized. The input or output ratio of such factories should be compared to other factories producing similar products. It is necessary to look for abnormalities that can, after investigation, lead to the detection of diversions.

Role of Police
Police have an extensive networks and, therefore, can check consignments of precursors in transit within a national territory as this is one of the weakest links in the chain of control over precursors. Precursors stolen during transit are often sold to illicit operators along the highways who, in turn, sell them to the illicit drug manufacturers. Often, this takes place through a series of intermediaries. The presence of alert, trained police on roads and along highways can help in checking suspicious movements of precursor chemicals.

Role of the Regulatory Authority
The regulatory authority, by whatever name it is called in any country (e.g., the Narcotics Control Bureau in India), usually issues and receives pre-export notifications, verifies the legitimacy of transactions and co-ordinates with other countries.

This authority may also be responsible for educating the chemical industry and trade to the possible threat of diversion of precursors. An enlightened industry and trade can develop voluntary codes of conduct to prevent diversion of precursors. Any attempt to divert a precursor by a trafficker will almost always be first known to someone in the trade who can pass on such intelligence to the authorities.

Since training is vital to the efficacy of precursor control measures in a country, the regulatory authority should take the lead in organizing precursor-training programmes. It is necessary for enforcement officers as well as the trade to be involved in such training.
The regulatory authority should also maintain a national database on precursor chemicals. This would help exercise better control over precursors meant for both domestic and international trade.


Role of Border Guards
Almost all countries deploy guards along their borders for the security of the nation. These border guards form the first line of defence against the smuggling of both goods and persons and can help foil attempts to smuggle precursor chemicals.
CHAPTER 9
International Operations
There are international operations aimed at preventing the diversion of precursors.
Different countries and international bodies work in tandem in these operations. Three such operations namely Operation Purple, Operation Topaz and Project Prism have so far been launched.

Operation Purple
Operation Purple was launched in 1999 to monitor the international movement of shipments of potassium permanganate (the precursor used in the illicit production of cocaine) to minimize the scope for their diversion.

Thirty-one authorities and three international bodies - ICPO-Interpol, INCB, and WCO participate in this operation which is guided by a steering committee. Central national authorities (CNAs) are designated under the operation to exchange intelligence on movements of potassium permanganate and monitor all shipments over 100 kg from the exporting countries till they reach their final destination. The operation has been successful as a result of which, illicit prices of potassium permanganate increased and the purity of cocaine has fallen.

Operation Topaz
Operation Topaz was launched in 2001 to monitor the international movement of consignments of acetic anhydride. Forty-six authorities and three international bodies - ICPO-Interpol, INCB, and WCO participate while a steering committee monitors the operation. International movements of consignments of acetic anhydride over 100 kg are monitored till they reach their final destination.
Operational activities have resulted in the identification of trafficking routes of acetic anhydride from Europe to West Asia. Furthermore, the networks responsible have been dismantled and the individuals involved prosecuted.


Project Prism
Project Prism, the latest of the international initiatives, is designed to address diversions of five main precursors used in the illicit manufacture of ATS, namely,
(i) ephedrine,
(ii) 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone,
(iii) 1-phenyl-2-propanone,
(iv) pseudoephedrine
and (v) safrole
as well as the equipment used in such manufacture .

Project Prism is directed by a task force supported by two working groups-the Chemicals Working Group and the Equipments Working Group. Operational activities commenced in January 2003 with a focus being placed on specific time-bound regional operations.
CHAPTER 10
ABBREVIATIONS:
ATS Amphetamine Type Stimulants
CND Commission on Narcotic Drugs
DMT Dimethyltryptamine
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council
HCl Hydrochloride
ICPO=Interpol=International Criminal Police Organisation
INCB International Narcotics Control Board
LSD Lysergic Acid Diethylamide
MDA 3,4-Methylenedioxyamphetamine
MDE 3,4-Methylenedioxyethamphetamine
MDMA 3,4- Methylenedioxymethamphetamine
NOC No Objection Certificate
PCP 1-(1-phenylcyclohexyl) Piperidine – also known as phencyclidine
PEN Pre-Export Notification
TCP 1-[1-(2-thienyl)cyclohexyl] Piperidine- also known as tenocyclidine
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WCO World Customs Organisation
*******